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Introduction:	The	Brexit	Time	Machine.		Brexit	is	a	process	replete	with	dates,	deadlines	and	timelines,	such	as	the	UK’s	45	years	of	EU	membership,	 the	European	Communities	Act1972,	 the	two	year	period	within	which	a	Withdrawal	Agreement	must	be	agreed,	the	date	of	‘Brexit	day’	being	29	March	2019,	and	now	December	2020	as	the	 likely	end	date	of	a	possible	 transition	 period.	 In	 an	 imaginary	 time	 machine,	 Brexit	 is	 therefore	taking	the	UK	one	step	forward,	and	another	step	back,	so	that	the	timeline	turns	from	 the	 horizontal	 to	 the	 spherical,	 turning	 back	 on	 itself	 to	 form	 a	 loop.	Wherever	one’s	political	affiliations	or	personal	orientations	lie,	this	closed	time	curve	requires	us	to	go	back	in	time	and	reconsider	the	reasons	why	a	transfer	of	powers	to	the	supranational	organisation	was	deemed	to	be	a	necessity,	or	even	desirable,	 in	 the	 first	place.	 It	 also	 requires	an	assessment	of	 the	positives	and	negatives	that	 this	decision	has	produced.	The	curve	then	moves	us	 forward	 in	time,	to	another	crucial	decision	on	if,	what	and	how	certain	aspects	and	effects	of	the	previous	decision	should	be	retained	after	leaving	the	EU.	This	article	will	try	 to	 follow	 the	 state	 aid	 regulation	 curve,	 with	 a	 little	 help	 from	 poetry,1	to	highlight	why	rules	on	public	 spending	are	necessary	 in	a	modern	economy.	 It	will	then	venture	a	few	considerations	on	a	probable	future	scenario	concerning	what	kind	of	regulatory	model	the	UK	could	adopt	following	its	exit	from	the	EU.		
1.	 The	 1st	 Quartet:	 ‘Time	 past	 and	 time	 future	 allow	 but	 a	 little	
consciousnesses’		The	 Port	 Talbot	 area	 in	 south	 Wales	 is	 forever	 associated	 with	 steel	 and,	unfortunately,	with	pollution.	It	is	the	home	of	the	Port	Talbot	Steelworks,	one	of	the	biggest	steel	plants	in	Europe,	if	not	the	world.	It	employs	around	10%	of	the	town’s	population,	and	it	is	said	to	be	able	to	produce	nearly	5	million	tonnes	of	steel	per	annum.	On	30	March	2016,	the	Tata	Steel	company	that	owns	the	plant	announced	that	it	was	pulling	out	of	its	UK	operations.2	Plans	to	find	new	owners	were	confusedly	patched	together,	but	produced	no	immediate	results.3																																																									
♣		 Professor	 of	 EU	 Law	 and	 Director	 Centre	 of	 European	 Law,	 King’s	 College	 London;	Academic	Associate	at	39	Essex	Chambers,	London.	1		 With	many	apologies	to	TS	Eliot,	Four	Quartets,	(Faber	&	Faber,	2001	Ed.).		
2  See G. Ruddick and H. Stewart, ‘Tata Steel to sell off entire British business’, The Guardian 
(30 March 2016), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/mar/29/tata-set-to-
announce-sale-of-uk-steel-business-port-talbot (accessed 20 May 2018).  
3  A rescue plan for the Port Talbot steelworks was a subsequently agreed, with plans for 
significant new investment: see M. Pooler and J. Pickard, ‘Tata and unions agree rescue plan for Port 
Talbot steelworks’, Financial Times (7 December 2016), available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/2aada674-bc9a-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080 (accessed 20 May 2018) and A. 
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On	23	June	2016,	of	 the	75,694	votes	cast	 in	 the	EU	Referendum	in	Neath	Port	Talbot	(the	voting	area	that	included	Port	Talbot),	those	in	favour	of	remaining	in	the	EU	were	32,651,	while	the	total	number	of	votes	cast	in	favour	of	leaving	the	 EU	 was	 43,001. 4 	Port	 Talbot,	 by	 a	 56%	 majority,	 chose	 Brexit	 amid	recriminations	 about	money	 going	 to	 Europe,	 a	 lack	 of	 protection	 from	 unfair	competition	 from	 China	 and	 opinions	 that	 EU	 state	 aid	 law	 prevented	 the	 UK	Government	 from	 bailing	 out	 the	 plant.5 	Port	 Talbot	 consequently	 became	symbolic	of	what	was	said	to	be	wrong	with	EU	state	aid	regulation	and,	 in	the	aftermath	of	the	referendum,	state	aid	was	singled	out	by	all	political	parties	as	one	 of	 the	 areas	 which	 was	 in	 most	 need	 of	 reform.	 On	 occasion	 a	 complete	abolition	of	the	state	aid	rules	was	suggested.		The	EU	system	of	control	of	state	aid	was	specifically	identified	as	a	‘problem’	in	two,	 opposing,	 respects:	 first,	 because	 it	 frustrates	 more	 market	 oriented	national	policies	of	liberalization	and	deregulation,	by	constraining	policies	into	a	 bureaucratic	 and	 rigid	 cage;6	and,	 second,	 because	 it	 prevents	 the	 pursuit	 of	socially	oriented	economic	policies,	as	it	simply	negates	any	role	for	the	state	in	pursuing	 these	 particular	 policies.7	The	 common	 denominator	 between	 these	two	very	different	takes	is	that	EU	state	aid	control	is	an	excessive	interference	in	national	economic	policies.		Although	 the	 state	 aid	 system	 is	 far	 from	perfect,	 if	 one	 briefly	moves	 back	 in	time	 these	 very	 sharp	 criticisms	 of	 state	 aid	 control	 seem	 to	 be	 rather	misconceived.	The	EU	system	of	state	aid	rules	were	certainly	among	 the	most	innovative	of	the	provisions	of	the	Treaty	of	Rome,	which	created	the	European	Economic	 Community,	 comprised	 of	 six	 post-Second	 World	 War	 industrialist	states,	which	had	economies	dominated	by	public	enterprises,	yet	still	decided	to	introduce	 stringent	 rules	 controlling	 public	 spending.8	The	 structure	 of	 the	Treaty	has	essentially	 remained	 the	 same	since	1957,	being	based	on	 ‘prohibit	first,	 repent	 later’	 rationale.	 What	 is	 now	 Article	 107(1)	 TFEU	 contains	 a	straightforward	prohibition	that	“any	aid	granted	by	a	Member	State	or	through																																																																																																																																																															
Tovey, ‘Tata workers vote for pension cut to rescue steel-making in Britain’, Daily Telegraph (15 
February 2017), available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/02/15/tata-workers-vote-
pension-cut-rescue-steel-making-britain/ (accessed 20 may 2018).  4	 Declaration	 of	 result	 for	 the	 Neath	 Port	 Talbot	 voting	 area,	 available	 at:	https://www.npt.gov.uk/media/5461/declaration_of_result.pdf	(accessed	20	May	2018).	5			 F	Araujo,	 ‘Hard	Brexit	Threatens	Welsh	Steel	but	Port	Talbot	 leavers	show	no	regrets’,	
The	 New	 Statesman,	 1	 March2018	https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/economy/2018/03/hard-brexit-threatens-welsh-steel-port-talbot-s-leavers-have-no-regrets	(accessed	20	May	2018).	6		 See	 HM	 Government	 Green	 Paper,	 Building	 our	 Industrial	 Strategy	 	 (January	 2017),	available	 at	 https://beisgovuk.citizenspace.com/strategy/industrial-strategy/supporting_documents/buildingourindustrialstrategygreenpaper.pdf	(accessed	20	May	2018),	which	included	proposals	of	‘cultivating	world-leading	sectors’	through	‘sector	deals’.		7		 See	 R.	 Tuck,	 ‘The	 Left	 Case	 for	 Brexit’,	 Dissent	 (6	 June	 2016),	 available	 at:	https://www.dissentmagazine.org/author/richard-tuck	(accessed	20	May	2018).	8		 M	Merola,	 ‘The	 Forces	 Shaping	 State	 Aid	 Control	 in	 the	 EU’,	 in	 L.	 Rubini	&	 J.	 Hawkins	(eds)	 ‘What	 Shapes	 the	 Law?	 Reflections	 on	 the	 History,	 Law,	 Politics	 and	 Economics	 of	
International	 and	 European	 Subsidy	 Disciplines’,	 (EUI/University	 of	 Birmingham,	 2016),	 101,	available	 at:	http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/42404/WhatShapesLaw_2016.pdf?sequence=3	(accessed	20	May	2018).	
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State	 resources	 in	 any	 form	 whatsoever	 which	 distorts	 or	 threatens	 to	 distort	
competition	by	favouring	certain	undertakings	or	the	production	of	certain	goods	
shall,	in	so	far	as	it	affects	trade	between	Member	States,	be	incompatible	with	the	
internal	market”.	 Only	 after	 aid	 granted	 in	 contravention	 of	 this	 prohibition	 is	permitted,	 can	Member	 States	 claim	 that	 an	 aid	measure	 could	 be	 compatible	with	 EU	 law,	 because	 it	 pursues	 certain	 objectives	 for	 the	 common	 good.	Famously,	the	job	of	supranational	referee	in	charge	of	‘surveillance’	of	the	entire	system	 was	 conferred	 on	 the	 European	 Commission	 (“the	 Commission”)	 by	what	is	now	Article	108	TFEU.	The	introduction	of	state	aid	control	in	the	Treaty	was	thus	an	essential	tool	for	the	 achievement	 of	 a	 common	market,	 by	 preventing	 participating	 states	 from	adopting	 protectionist	 measures,	 and	 by	 providing	 a	 neutral	 forum	 for	 the	avoidance	of	subsidies	wars.	Curiously,	it	has	been	mainly	thanks	to	the	influence	of	the	UK	that	state	aid	control	gradually	became	something	different,	and	is	now	also	 perceived	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	 market	 efficiency	 and	 competition.	 From	Commissioner	 Leon	 Brittan’s	 tough	 stance	 on	 enforcement,	 continuing	 with	Gordon	Brown’s	push	 for	 a	 reform	of	 state	 aid	 control	 geared	 towards	 a	more	‘economic’	 approach,	 the	 focus	 gradually	 moved	 to	 state	 aid	 rules	 being	considered	 as	 tools	 for	 guaranteeing	 a	 level	 playing	 field	 in	 the	market	 place.	State	aid	rules	were	then	perceived	as	essential	in	preventing	the	waste	of	public	resources	on	policies,	or	on	undertakings,	that	the	market	would	never	support.	The	 UK	 always	 insisted	 on	 using	 state	 aid	 rules	 to	 prevent	 the	 survival	 of	inefficient	 and	unproductive	 industries,	which	would	otherwise	be	detrimental	to	more	efficient	operators.9		On	the	whole,	one	can	safely	argue	that	this	is	now	broadly	the	approach	taken	by	the	EU	institutions.	For	example,	and	to	provide	a	snapshot,	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 the	 progressive	 elevation	 of	 the	 market	operator	 principle	 from	 a	 criterion	 to	 determine	 the	 compatibility	 of	 national	measures,	 to	 a	 constitutive	 and	 essential	 criterion	 in	 determining	 if	 a	 national	measure	 should	be	 classified	 as	 aid.10	As	 reaffirmed	 in	 its	 recent	Notice	 on	 the	notion	of	State	Aid,	the	Commission	considers	that:		“it	 is	 not	 relevant	whether	 the	 intervention	 constitutes	 a	 rational	means	 for	 the	
public	 bodies	 to	 pursue	 public	 policy	 (for	 example	 employment)	 considerations.	
Similarly,	 the	 profitability	 or	 unprofitability	 of	 the	 beneficiary	 is	 not	 in	 itself	 a	
decisive	 indicator	 for	 establishing	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 economic	 transaction	 in	
question	 is	 in	 line	 with	 market	 conditions.	 The	 decisive	 element	 is	 whether	 the	
public	 bodies	 acted,	 as	 a	 market	 economy	 operator	 would	 have	 done	 in	 an	
analogous	situation.	If	this	is	not	the	case,	the	beneficiary	undertaking	has	received	
an	economic	advantage,	which	 it	would	not	have	obtained	under	normal	market	




is	and	how	public	authorities	can	make	sure	they	comply	with	the	rules:	(10	 July	2015),	available	at:	https://www.gov.uk/guidance/state-aid	(accessed	20	May	2018).	10			 See,	for	example,	Case	C-124/10	P	Commission	v	EDF,	ECLI:	EU:	C:	2012:318.	11		 Commission	 Notice	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 State	 aid	 as	 referred	 to	 in	 Article	 107(1)	 of	 the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union,	OJ	2016	C	262/18. 	
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The	Court	of	Justice	has	also	been	vigilant	in	requiring	the	Commission	to	strictly	monitor	 the	 ‘inherent	 economic	 rationality	 of	 a	 state	 measure	‘”.12As	 is	 now	standard	 dicta,	 state	 aid	 is	 therefore	 an	 expression	 of	 the	 “essential	 task	
of	ensuring	 that	 competition	 in	 the	 internal	 market	 is	 not	 distorted’”. 13	Furthermore,	 with	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 State	 Aid	Modernization	Plan	strategy,14	which	included	the	adoption	of	the	General	Block	Exemption	 Regulation	 (“GBER”),15	state	 aid	 control	 went	 through	 a	 form	 of	revolution,	 switching	 from	 a	 system	 of	 ex	 ante	 control,	 based	 on	 the	 duty	 to	notify	a	aid	measures	to	the	Commission	and	on	the	need	to	wait	for	a	green	light	before	 implementation,	 to	 one	 of	 ex	 post	 control,	 whereby	 certain	 kinds	 of	economic	 policies	 (such	 as	 research	 innovation,	 to	 risk	 capital,	 broadband,	regional	 aid,	 aviation,	 energy,	 and	 the	 environment)	 are	 all	 considered	worthy	areas	 in	 which	 States	 can	 invest	 and	 are	 deemed,	 within	 certain	 pre-defined	limits,	 to	 be	 ‘good’	 aid	 per	 se,	 meaning	 they	 do	 not	 need	 to	 be	 notified	 to	 the	Commission	for	approval.16	 
 The	adherence	to	market-friendly	criteria	does	not,	however,	prevent	the	pursuit	of	progressive	socially	oriented	policies.	The	Treaty	itself	offers,	in	Article	107(3)	TFEU,	wide	possibilities	to	make	aid	compatible	with	EU	law,	 listing	a	series	of	grounds	 on	 which	 aid	 can	 be	 compatible	 and	 thus	 lawful.	 Consequently,	 it	 is	abundantly	possible	for	Member	States	to	show	that	even	measures	that	involve	a	 degree	 of	 selective	 financial	 support	 are	 fully	 justified	 in	 pursuance	 of	 the	general	 interest.	The	UK	has	been	one	of	 the	most	successful	Member	States	 in	dealing	with	such	state	aid	control,	with	a	majority	of	domestic	policies	notified	to	the	Commission	being	found	to	be	compatible.17																																																										12		 Case	C-579/16	Commission	v	FIH	Holding	ECLI:	EU:	C:	2018:159,	at	para	63.	13		 Case	C184/11	Commission	v	Spain		ECLI:	EU:	C:	2014:316.	14		 Communication	 from	 the	 Commission	 to	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 the	 Council,	 the	European	Economic	and	Social	Committee	and	 the	Committee	of	 the	Regions,	COM	(2012)	209	Final	 (8	 May	 2012).	 For	 a	 list	 of	 the	 measures	 adopted	 see:	http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/index_en.html	 (accessed	 20	 May	2018).				15		 Commission	 Regulation	 (EU)	 No	 651/2014	 declaring	 certain	 categories	 of	 aid	compatible	with	the	internal	market	in	application	of	Articles	107	and	108	of	the	Treaty,	OJ	2014	L	187/1,	as	amended	by	Commission	Regulation	(EU)	No	2017/1084,	OJ	2017	L	156/1.	See	also	the	 so-called	 SGEI	 package,	 a	 series	 of	 measures	 adopted	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 that	clarifies	the	application	of	state	aid	law	to	SGEIs,	in	particular	the	conditions	under	public	service	compensation	 should	 not	 be	 considered	 as	 aid.	 Communication	 on	 the	 application	 of	 the	European	Union	State	aid	rules	to	compensation	granted	for	the	provision	of	services	of	general	economic	interest,	Official	Journal	C8,	11.01.2012,	p.	4-14;	Decision	on	the	application	of	Article	106(2)	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	to	State	aid	in	the	form	of	public	service	compensation	granted	to	certain	undertakings	entrusted	with	the	operation	of	services	of	general	 economic	 interest,	 Official	 Journal	 L7,	 11.01.2012,	 p.	 3-10;	 Communication	 on	the	European	 Union	 framework	 for	 State	 aid	 in	 the	 form	 of	 public	 service	compensation(2011)Official	 Journal	C8,	11.01.2012,	p.	15-22	and	Regulation	on	 the	application	of	Articles	107	 and	108	of	 the	Treaty	 on	 the	Functioning	of	 the	European	Union	 to	de	minimis	aid	granted	 to	 undertakings	 providing	 services	 of	 general	 economic	 interest,	 Official	 Journal	 L	114	of	26.4.2012,	p.	8.	16		 The	emphasis	on	market	efficiency	and	horizontal	virtuous	policies	fits	the	UK	economic	model	very	well,	where	selective	industrial	policies,	at	least	until	the	Coalition	government,	were	rare.	See	further	N	Crafts,	Brexit	and	State	aid,	(2017)	33	Oxf.	Rev.	Econ,	Policy	105.		17		 See	 the	 data	 reported	 in	 A.	 Biondi,	 ‘State	 Aid,	 government	 spending	 and	 the	 virtue	 of	loyalty’,	in	P.	Birkinshaw	&	A.	Biondi	(eds.)	‘Britain	Alone?’	(Kluwer,	2016),	291.	
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	Arguably,	although	the	notion	of	 ‘aid’	is	supposed	to	be	an	objective	notion,	the	Court	of	Justice	itself	has	also	pragmatically	recognized	that	some	delimitation	of	what	 constitutes	 state	 aid	might	be	necessary	 so	as	not	 to	undermine	national	policies	 pursing	 interests	worth	 protecting.	 For	 instance,	 in	Paint	Graphos,	 the	Court	 found	 that	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 fiscal	 treatment	 applied	 to	producers’	and	workers’	 cooperative	societies	could	not	be	considered	as	state	aid,	because	cooperatives	were	not	in	a	comparable	factual	and	legal	situation	to	that	 of	 commercial	 companies.18	Similarly,	 and	most	 recently,	 in	 a	 case	dealing	with	a	system	of	progressive	tax	criterion	based	on	the	size	of	the	establishment	that	 resulted	 in	 a	 tax	 exemption	 for	 small	 businesses,	 the	Court	 of	 Justice	 first	agreed	with	the	Spanish	government	that	the	purpose	of	the	tax	in	question	was	to	contribute	towards	environmental	protection	and	town	and	country	planning,	because	it	attempted	to	correct	and	counteract	the	environmental	and	territorial	consequences	of	the	activities	of	large	retail	establishments.	It	also	held	that	the	measure	was	not	selective	 in	nature,	and	therefore	 it	was	not	aid	under	Article	1071(1)	TFEU,	because	small	businesses	were	not	 in	a	comparable	situation	to	large	retailers.	19		
2.	The	Second	Quartet:	‘In	my	beginning	is	my	end’		Once	 EU	 state	 aid	 control	 is	 brought	 back	 to	 its	 proper	 milieu,	 the	 question	remains	 as	 to	what	 extent	 state	 aid	 rules	 should	be	preserved	 in	 a	post-Brexit	era.	As	with	many	other	areas	of	 the	UK’s	disentanglement	from	the	EU,	a	 final	settlement	 should	 be	 agreed	 by	 both	 sides	 ideally	 by	 dividing	 “half	 a	 sheet	 of	
paper	 by	 a	 line	 into	 two	 columns,	 writing	 over	 the	 one	Pro,	 and	 over	 the	 other	Con.”	 20 	When	 the	 time	 eventually	 comes	 to	 start	 negotiating	 the	 future	relationship	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 UK,	 the	 two	 sides	 might,	 however,	 have	different	views	as	to	both	the	pros	and	the	cons.			As	for	the	UK,	its	government	has	insisted	that	it	will	seek	a	bespoke	agreement	that	will	forge	a	‘deep	and	special	partnership’,	which	should	mean	an	agreement	that	might	guarantee	deeper	integration	in	the	EU	market	than	that	afforded	to	third	countries	by	existing	free	trade	agreements	concluded	by	the	EU.	21		The	EU	position	is	contrarily	concerned	that	the	Brexit	process	will	simply	create	regulatory	 competition,	 particularly	 insidious,	 as	 it	 would	 come	 from	 a	 large	country	that	is	geographically	close	and	interlinked	with	the	European	economy.	The	 EU	 has	 always	 insisted	 that	 any	 future	 agreement	 should	 ensure	 a	 level	playing	 field	 (“LPF”),	 that	 all	 players	 play	 by	 the	 same	 rules.	 Therefore,	 the	European	 Council	 Guidelines	 of	 29	April	 2017	 state	 very	 clearly	 that	 “any	 free																																																									18		 Joined	Cases	C-78/08	to	C-80/08	Paint	Graphos	and	others,	ECLI:	EU:	C:	2011:550.	19		 Joined	Cases	C-233	to	C-237/16	Asociación	Nacional	de	Grandes	Empresas	de	Distribución	
(ANGED)	v	Generalitat	de	Catalunya	ECLI:	EU:	C:	2017:854.	20		 B.	 Franklin,	 Letter	 to	 the	 English	 chemist	 Joseph	 Priestley,	 (19	 September	 1772),	available	 at	 https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-19-02-0200	 (accessed	 20	May	2018).		21		 See	 Chancellor	 of	 the	 Exchequer,	 Philip	 Hammond	 and	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Exiting	 the	European	Union,	David	Davis,	A	deep	and	special	partnership,	at	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-article-a-deep-and-special-partnership	 (accessed	on	6	June	2018).	
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trade	 agreement	 should	 be	 balanced',	 ambitious	 and	 wide-ranging	 ...	 A	 level	
playing	field	must	be	ensured,	notably	in	terms	of	competition	and	state	aid,	and	in	
this	regard,	encompass	safeguards	against	unfair	competitive	advantages	through,	
inter	alia,	tax;	social,	environmental	and	regulatory	measures	and	practices.” 22	In	January	 2018,	 the	 reaffirmed	 that	 the	 LPF	 is	 a	 ‘horizontal’	 principle	 that	 cuts	across	different	policy	areas,	and	according	to	the	Commission,	mainly	concerns	competition	“	and	 state	 aid,	 social	 and	 environmental	 standards,	 taxation,	 other	
regulatory	measures	and	practices’”23	implying	that	a	narrow	sectorial	approach	would	not	work.			The	UK	government	has	gradually	appeared	to	accept	that	some	form	of	state	aid	control	 would	 be	 needed.	 Eventually,	 Prime	 Minister	 Theresa	 May,	 in	 her	Mansion	House	speech	on	2	March	2018,	indicated	that	“the	UK	has	much	to	gain	
from	maintaining	 proper	 disciplines	 on	 the	 use	 of	 subsidies	 and	 anti-competitive	
practices”.24 	Significantly,	 Andrew	 Griffiths	 MP,	 Minister	 for	 Small	 Business,	Consumers	 &	 Corporate	 Responsibility,	 confirmed	 that	 “the	Government’s	 view	
therefore	 is	 that	 the	 UK	 should	 be	 prepared	 to	 establish	 a	 full,	 UK-wide	 subsidy	
control	framework,	with	a	single	UK	body	for	enforcement	and	supervision,	at	the	
point	this	is	required”.25			
3.	The	Third	Quartet:	‘there	is	no	end	but	addition’		The	 next	 question	 is,	 what	 form	 could	 a	 future	 UK	model	 of	 state	 aid	 control	take?26		Any	future	system	should	be	built	around	three	interlinked	pillars:	first,	substantive	provisions;	 second,	 an	enforcement	authority;	 and,	 third,	 a	dispute	settlement	system.27		3.1	Future	substantive	provisions:	‘a	full,	UK-wide	subsidy	control	framework’			The	first,	and	somehow	easiest,	option	would	be	to	simply	fall	back	on	the	WTO’s	rules	on	subsidies,	which	of	course	will	continue	to	apply	to	the	UK	by	virtue	of	
																																																								22		 European	Council	(Art.	50)	guidelines	following	the	United	Kingdom's	notification	under	Article	 50	 TEU	 (29	 April	 2017,	 available	 at	 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29/euco-brexit-guidelines	(accessed	20	May	2018),	para.	20.		23		 European	Commission,	Slides	on	Level	Playing	Field,	TF50	(2018)	27	-	Commission	to	EU	27.	 (31	 January	 2018),	 slide	 5,	 available	 at	 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/level_playing_field.pdf	(accessed	20	May	2018).		24		 Rt	 Hon	 Theresa	May	MP,	Our	 future	 economic	 partnership	with	 the	European	Union	 (2	Marc	2018),	available	at	https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on-our-future-economic-partnership-with-the-european-union	(accessed	20	May	2018).		25		 Andrew	Griffiths	MP,	Letter	to	House	of	Lords	Internal	Market	Sub-Committee	(28	March	2018),	 available	 at	 https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-internal-market-subcommittee/brexit-competition/Letter-Andrew-Griffiths-to-Rt-Hon-Lord-Whitty-State-aid.pdf	 (accessed	 20	 May	 2018),	 in	 reply	 to	 House	 of	 Lords	 European	 Union	 Internal	Market	 Sub-Committee,	 Brexit:	 competition	 and	 State	 aid	 HL	 Paper	 67.	 (2	 February	 2018),	available	at	https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/67/67.pdf.					26		 Some	of	the	ideas	contained	in	this	section	are	based	on	the	author’s	written	evidence	to	the	House	of	Lords	European	Union	Internal	Market	Sub-Committee,	cit.	above	fn	n.25.	27		 European Commission, Slides on Level Playing Field (fn.23), slide 7. 	
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its	autonomous	membership	of	the	WTO.28	It	is	questionable	whether	this	would	be	a	rational	choice	for	the	UK,	and	whether,	if	this	position	was	adopted,	it	could	represent	 a	 stumbling	 block	 to	 further	 negotiations	 with	 the	 EU.	 WTO	 rules,	despite	apparently	offering	additional	flexibility,29	might,	arguably,	be	of	limited	application	 and	 would	 not	 provide	 the	 government,	 and	 business	 operators	especially,	with	sufficient	legal	certainty.			Two	 strenuous	 rounds	 of	 WTO	 negotiations	 (the	 Tokyo	 and	 the	 Uruguay	Rounds)	 produced	 the	 Agreement	 on	 Subsidies	 and	 Countervailing	 Measures	(“SCM	 Agreement”),	 one	 of	 the	 very	 few	 international	 agreements	 with	 no	preamble	at	all.30	Some	suggested	 this	was	because	 the	drafters	decided	 that	 it	would	have	been	 impossible	 to	agree	on	 its	object	and	purpose.31	Several	WTO	Dispute	Settlement	Panel	and	Appellate	Body	decisions	have	gradually	clarified	that	 the	 aim	 of	 the	 SCM	 Agreement	 is	 to	 impose	 ‘multilateral	 disciplines	 on	
subsidies	that	distort	international	trade	or	 to	reduce	economic	distortion	caused	
by	 subsidies”.	 32 	Nonetheless,	 even	 if	 such	 a	 rationale	 is	 agreed,	 the	 SCM	Agreement	 still	 has	 a	 limited	 scope.	33	The	 definition	 of	 ‘subsidy’,	 contained	 in	Article	 1,	 requires	 a	 measure	 to	 be	 classified	 as	 such	 by	 either	 being	 directly	taken	by	governments,	or	attributable	to	them,	and	by	being	a	grant	of	a	specific	advantage	 to	 an	 undertaking.	 These	 criteria	 are	 still	 going	 through	 several	interpretations	 before	 the	 WTO	 Appellate	 Body 34 ,	 but	 whatever	 such	 a	hermeneutic	activity	might	eventually	produce,	the	rules	still	only	apply	to	trade	in	 goods,	 and	 they	 mainly	 prohibit	 export	 subsidies	 and	 import	 substitution	subsidies.	 Furthermore,	 to	 obtain	 a	 decision	 terminating	 the	 subsidy,	 the	existence	of	serious	prejudice	to	the	interests	of	another	WTO	member,	 ’as	well	as	the	impairment	of	market	access,	needs	to	be	proven.		Two	further	 limitations	of	 the	WTO	system	of	controlling	subsidies	should	also	be	 highlighted.	 First,	 the	 SCM	 Agreement	 is	 based	 on	 a	 system	 of	 prior	notification,	which	in	theory	should	be	used	to	pre-empt	any	possible	distortive	impact	a	subsidy	may	have.	However,	the	various	reports	on	compliance	with	the	notification	 mechanisms	 are	 usually	 discouraging.	 For	 instance,	 in	 2015,	 79	members	completely	 failed	to	notify	any	measure,	and	many	of	 these	members	
																																																								28				The	UK,	together	with	the	EU	and	all	other	Member	states	signed	the	Marrakesh	Agreement	establishing	the	World	Trade	Organization	on	15	April	1994,	Vol.	1867,	1-31874	United	Nations,	Treaty	Series,	Nations	Unies	—	Recueil	des	Traités	1995.	Although	there	seems	to	be	no	disputes	about	UK	membership	there	will	be	certainly	negotiations	with	other	WTO	members	about	the	terms	of	membership	and	the	commitments	the	UK	makes	in	the	WTO.	29		 A.	Weiberger,	‘State	Aid	Regulations	after	Brexit:	A	Good	Deal	for	the	UK?’	in	J.A.	Hillman	&	 G.N.	 Horlick	 (eds.),	 Legal	 Aspects	 of	 Brexit:	 Implications	 of	 the	 United	 Kingdom’s	 Decision	 to	
Withdraw	from	the	European	Union	(Institute	of	International	Economic	Law,	2017),	88.		30		 Agreement	on	Subsidies	and	Countervailing	Measures,	1869	U.N.T.S.	14.	31		 M.	 Cartland,	 G	 Depayre	 and	 J	 Woznoswky,	 Is	 something	 wrong	 in	 the	 WTO	 dispute	
settlement?	(2012)	46(5),	Journal	of	World	Trade	979	at	992.	32		 Panel	Report,	Brazil	–	Export	Financing	Programme	for	Aircraft,	WT/DS46/R,	para	7.26.	33		 See	 further	 L.	Rubini,	The	Definition	of	Subsidy	and	State	Aid,	 (Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford,	2009)	esp.	chapter	4.	34 See	 e.g.	 Appellate	 Body	 Report	 US-	 Anti	 Dumping	 and	 Countervailing	 Duties	 (China)	WT/DS379/AB/R,	25	March	2011	and	Panel	Report.	EC	and	certain	Member	States-Large	Civil	Aircraft,	WT/DS353	23	of	March	as	modified	by	Appellate	Body	Report	WT/DS353/AB/R.		
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have	either	never	so	notified,	or	have	done	so	only	in	the	distant	past.35	Second,	and	 contrary	 to	WTO	 rules,	 the	 SCM	 Agreement	 does	 not	 contain	 any	 specific	rules	 on	 how	 to	 balance	 the	 grant	 of	 a	 possibly	 distortive	 subsidy	 with	 the	preservation	 of	 certain	 public	 aims.	 Contrary	 to	 the	WTO	Agreement,	 the	 SCM	Agreement	does	not	contain	specific	provisions,	such	as	Article	XX,	that	contains	a	 series	 of	 ‘general	 exceptions’	 that	 allow	 participating	 states	 to	 adopt	 trade	restrictions	 if	 necessary	 for	 example,	 necessary	 to	 protect	 public	 heath	 or	 the	environment,	 36 and	 only	 by	 some	 acrobatic	 and	 very	 much	 criticized	interpretation	of	the	Appellate	Body,	have	states	been	able	to	rely	on	legitimate	public	aims.37		Some	 further	 inspiration	 could	 possibly	 come	 from	 the	 so-called	 ‘new	generation’	of	free	trade	agreements	(“FTAs”)	concluded	by	the	EU,	on	the	legal	basis	 of	 the	 provisions	 introduced	 by	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty.38		 As	 far	 as	 subsidies	regulation	 is	 concerned,	 some	 of	 these	 FTAs	 contain	 similar	 provisions	 to	 the	SCM	agreement.	This	is	the	case	in	relation	to	the	Comprehensive	Economic	and	Trade	 Agreement	 (“CETA”)	 with	 Canada,	 for	 instance.39	Others	 tend	 to	 reach	beyond	the	WTO	scenario,	such	as,	for	example,	the	EU’s	agreements	with	South	Korea	 (currently	 in	 force), 40 	Vietnam	 (pending	 ratification), 41 	Singapore 42	(pending	ratification)	and	Japan	(under	negotiation).43		Each	of	these	agreements	rely	on	a	wider	prohibition	on	subsidies,	which	extends	to	subsidies	provided	to	ailing	companies	without	any	credible	plan	for	a	return	to	profit	and	to	unlimited	state	guarantees.		A	particularly	relevant	point	in	the	Brexit	context	is	that	these	FTAs	 provide	 a	 clear	 rationale	 for	 subsidy	 control,	 identified	 by	 the	 fact	 that	subsidies	 can	 “negatively	 affect	 or	 are	 likely	 to	 affect	 competition	 and	 trade’.44	Furthermore,	 they	 provide	 a	 possible	 internal	 remedy,	 as	 the	 parties	 commit																																																									35		 Notification	provisions	under	the	agreement	on	subsidies	and	countervailing	measures,	background	note	by	the	secretariat	g/scm/w/546/rev.8,	31	March	2017	(17-1796)	page:	1/41.	
36 1994 Agreement, see above fn n. 28. 37		 See,	for	instance,	WTO	Panel	Report,	Canada	–	Certain	Measures	Affecting	the	Renewable	
Energy	Generation	 Sector;	 Canada	–	Measures	Relating	 to	 the	Feed-In	Tariff	 Program	 (Canada	–	
Renewable	Energy),	WT/DS412/R;	WT/DS426/R	(2012).	See	further	A.	Cosbey	and	C.	Mavroidis	
A	 Turquoise	 Mess:	 Green	 Subsidies,	 Blue	 Industrial	 Policy	 and	 Renewable	 Energy:	 The	 Case	 for	
Redrafting	 the	Subsidies	Agreement	of	 the	WTO,	 (2014)	 17/1	Journal	 of	 International	 Economic	Law,	11.	38		 See	 Articles	 216	 –	 218	 TFEU.	 For	 an	 updated	 list	 of	 EU	 agreements	 see	 European	External	 Action	 Service’s	 Treaties	 Office	 Database,	 available	 at	http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do	(accessed	20	May	2018).	See	further	L.	Borlini	 and	 C.	 Dordi,	Deepening	 International	 Systems	 of	 Subsidy	 Control:	 The	 (Different)	 Legal	
Regimes	of	Subsidies	in	the	EU	Bilateral	Preferential	Trade	Agreements	(2017)	23	Colum.	J.	Eur.	L.	551.	39		 Comprehensive	 Economic	 and	 Trade	 Agreement	 (CETA)	 between	 Canada,	 and	 the	European	Union	and	its	Member	States	(30	October2016),	OJ	2017	L	11/23.	40		 Free	 Trade	 Agreement	 between	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 its	 Member	 States	 and	 the	Republic	of	Korea,	OJ	2011	L127/6.		41	 Free	 Trade	 Agreement	 between	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 the	 Socialist	 Republic	 of	Vietnam	(1	February	2016);	see	http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?	id=1437.	42		 Free	 Trade	 Agreement	 between	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 the	 Republic	 of	 Singapore	(April	 2018);	 see	 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?	 id=961	 (accessed	 20	May	2018).	
43  Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and Japan (April 2018); see 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm? id=1767 (accessed 20 May 2018).   
44  See e.g. Art 11 Singapore Agreement, above, fn.  N. 42.  
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themselves	 to	 stop	 the	 potential	 distortive	 effects	 of	 subsidies	 through	 the	application	 of	 their	 domestic	 competition	 law.	 A	 final	 comment	 is,	 however,	necessary:	the	influence	of	EU	state	aid	law	is	very	visible.	For	instance,	Article	107(2)	 and	 (3)	 TFEU	 on	 compatibility	 of	 aid	 is	 repeated	 verbatim	 in	 the	EU/Vietnam	 FTA,45	and	 in	 an	 Annex	 to	 the	 EU/Singapore	 FTA.46	In	 addition,	Article	 11.7(4)	 of	 Chapter	 11	 of	 the	 EU/Singapore	 FTA	 provides	 that	 the	prohibition	on	subsidies	does	not	apply	to	subsidies	granted	as	compensation	for	performing	public	service	obligations,	which	is	a	word	for	word	repetition	of	the	
Altmark	formula	developed	by	the	Court	of	Justice	in	the	application	of	state	aid	law	to	services	of	general	economic	interest.47		The	other	possible	solution	(although	not	as	ready-made	as	some	suggest)	is	to	embrace	 EU-parallel	 systems	 that	 simply	 replicate	 the	 existing	 EU	 legal	framework.	The	most	debated	one	is	the	European	Economic	Area	(“EEA”).48	The	EEA	Agreement’s	provisions	on	aid	are	nearly	identical	to	those	in	EU	state	aid	law.	 Article	 61	 EEA	 reproduces	 the	 definition	 of	 aid	 contained	 in	 Article	 107	TFEU,	which	 the	EFTA	Court	has	 interpreted	consistently,	 considering	 the	case	law	of	the	Court	of	Justice,	as	required	by	Article	6	EEA.49	Annex	XV	to	the	EEA	Agreement	contains	sectoral	binding	rules,	which	are	identical	to	those	found	in	EU	 law.	 In	 addition,	 the	 EFTA	 Surveillance	 Authority	 (“ESA”)	 undertakes	 a	supranational	enforcement	 function,	which,	aside	 from	a	 few	minor	procedural	issues,	is	almost	identical	to	that	exercised	by	the	Commission.	The	near	perfect	symmetry	between	the	two	systems	has	been	recently	confirmed	by	the	fact	that	the	 ESA	 has	 adopted	 verbatim	 the	 Commission’s	 Notice	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 aid,	amending	only	a	few	footnotes.50		Apart	 from	 the	 observations	 as	 to	 the	 disadvantages	 of	 being	 a	 rule-taker,	 a	position	 the	 UK	would	 find	 itself	 in	 as	 an	 EEA	member,	 and	 having	 no	 say	 in	shaping	EU	 rules,	 it	 should	be	 remembered	 that	 the	ESA	has	 considerably	 less	experience	in	handling	state	aid	cases	when	compared	to	that	of	the	Commission.	In	 addition,	 the	 EFTA	 Court	 has	 a	 one	 stop	 jurisdiction,	 with	 no	 direct	 action	available	 for	 companies	 and	 governments	 which	 wish	 to	 challenge	 adverse	decisions,	which	is	possible	in	the	EU	system.		Other	examples	of	EU	 state	aid	parallel	 systems	are	 the	agreements	 concluded	between	the	EU	and	States	that	either	have	acceded,	or	could	accede,	to	the	EU.51																																																										
45  EU/Vietnam FTA (fn n.41), Chapter 11 (Competition Policy), Section II, Article x.1 (2) 
46  EU/Singapore FTA (fn. n.42), Chapter 11, Annex 11-A, para.2.  47		 Case	 C-280/00,	 Altmark	 Trans	 GmbH	 and	 Regierungspräsidium	 Magdeburg	 v	
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft	 Altmark	 GmbH,	 and	 Oberbundesanwalt	 beim	 Bundesverwaltungsgericht.		ECLI:	EU:	C:	2003:415.	48		 Agreement	on	the	European	Economic	Area,	OJ	1994	L	1/3.	49		 See	for	instance	Case	E-25/15,	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	v	Iceland	(29	July	2016).	50		 EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	Decision	No	3/17/COL	of	18	January	2017	amending		the	procedural	and	substantive	rules	 in	 the	 field	of	State	aid	by	 introducing	new	Guidelines	on	the	notion	of	State	aid	as	referred	to	in	Article	61(1)	of	the	Agreement	on	the	European	Economic	Area	[2017/2413],	OJ	2017	L	342/35.	51		 See	Association	Agreement	between	the	EU,	Euratom	and	their	Member	States	and	the	Republic	 of	 Moldova,	 OJ	 2014	 L	260/4;	 Association	 Agreement	 between	 the	 EU,	 Euratom	 and	their	Member	States	and	Georgia,	OJ	2014	L	261/4;	and	Association	Agreement	between	the	EU	and	its	Member	States	and	Ukraine,	OJ	2014	L	161/3.	
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The	 rationale	 of	 these	 agreements	 is	 to	 require,	 as	 a	 precondition	 to	 full	membership,	the	progressive	alignment	of	national	rules	with	EU	state	aid	rules,	and	all	contain	provisions	that	are	nearly	identical	to	those	found	in	EU	state	aid	law.52	In	conclusion,	many	will	not	escape	 the	 irony	 that	EU	state	aid	 rules	are	the	 best	 example	 as	 to	 how	 to	 ensure	 a	 “full,	 UK-wide	 subsidy	 control	
framework”.53		3.2.	Enforcement	Mechanism:	‘a	single	UK	body	for	enforcement	and	supervision’		The	next	pillar	 required	 for	 effective	 control	 of	 state	 aid	 is	 the	provision	of	 an	efficient	mechanism	 for	 the	enforcement	of	whatever	rules	have	been	selected.	The	Commission,	for	better	or	for	worse,	has	undertaken	this	role	by	providing	Member	States	with	a	‘locus’	to	test	their	economic	policies,	whilst	concurrently	serving	as	a	guardian	of	market	compliance	against	the	most	profligate	Member	States,	 ensuring	 they	 did	 not	 use	 public	 money	 to	 protect	 their	 undertakings.	Furthermore,	the	Commission	gradually	started	involving	private	actors,	mostly	competitors,	 in	 order	 to	 “increase	 the	detection	capacity	of	 the	Commission	and	
lend	credibility	to	its	claim	of	neutrality”.	54		Some	creative	work	 is	 therefore	necessary	to	create	an	 ‘independent	regulator’	which	would	avoid	promiscuous	entanglement	through	the	same	measure	being	issued,	and	 then	assessed,	by	 the	same	government	department,	and	 to	ensure	the	UK’s	internal	market,	including	its	devolved	authorities,	functions	smoothly.	The	 UK	 Government	 has	 identified	 the	 Competition	 and	 Markets	 Authority	(“CMA”)	 as	 the	 likely	 candidate,	 because	 “this	 reflects	 its	 experience	 and	
understanding	of	markets	as	the	UK’s	competition	regulator	and	the	independence	
of	its	decision-making	from	Government.”55	The	CMA	has	recently	announced	that	it	has	made	two	senior	appointments,	for	a	Senior	Director	and	a	Project	Director	of	State	Aid,	to	assist	in	preparing	for	exercising	its	new	state	aid	powers.56	The	CMA	solution	has	many	obvious	attractive	features,	because	the	CMA’s	legal	and	economic	expertise	is	widely	admired.	Some	more	detailed	observations	can	also	be	made.			First,	 the	 task	will	 be	 comparatively	 less	 daunting	 than	 could	 be	 expected.	 As	mentioned	 above,	 the	 State	 Aid	 Modernization	 Plan	 implemented	 by	 the	Commission,	 with	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 GBER,	 is	 per	 se	 a	 process	 of	decentralization,	 as	 it	 allows	 Member	 States	 to	 adopt	 measures	 without	requiring	 the	 Commission’s	 approval.	 Fewer	 notifications	 obviously	mean	 that																																																									52		 See,	for	instance,	Article	339	of	the	EU/Moldova	Association	Agreement	(fn	n.51),	which	replicates	the	wording	of	Article	107	TFEU.			53		 A.	Griffiths,	cit.	above	fn.	25.This	does	not,	however,	mean	that	EU	state	aid	law	should	be	transplanted	 en	bloc	 into	UK	 law,	 as	 possible	modifications	 and	 improvements	 could	 be	 easily	inserted.	For	 instance,	UK	 local	authorities	have	usually	agreed	to	advocate	a	 less	complex	and	burdensome	approval	process	than	under	the	current	EU	regime.	See	House	of	Lords	Report	cit.	above	fn	n.25.	54		 M.P.	 Smith,	 Autonomy	 by	 the	 Rules:	 The	 European	 Commission	 and	 the	 Development	 of	
State	Aid	Policy,	(1998)	36/1	Journal	of	Common	Market	Studies,	55,	at	63.	55		 Andrew	Griffiths	MP	cit.	fn	n.25.	
56  See CMA announcement of 10 April 2018, available at: 
https://twitter.com/CMAgovUK/status/983681346177585152 (accessed 20 May 2018).  
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the	Commission	can	focus	its	resources	on	cases	which	are	more	likely	to	cause	a	serious	 distortion	 of	 competition.	 The	 same	 approach	 can	 be	 adapted	 and	embedded	 into	 the	 working	 of	 the	 CMA,	 whereby	 public	 funding	 to	 achieve	specified	 horizontal	 economic	 policies	 below	 a	 certain	 monetary	 threshold	would	not	need	to	be	notified	to	and	investigated	by	the	CMA.		Second,	any	process	of	decentralization	of	state	aid	control	involves	certain	risks	and	 challenges57	for	 the	 regulator,	 even	 one	 as	 competent	 and	 independent	 as	the	CMA.	In	terms	of	political	capture,	it	is	undisputed	that	national	governments	
naturally	 tend	 to	 support	 national	 producers,	 for	 various	 reasons,	 whether	economic,	 social	 or	 just	 to	 preserve	 political	 consensus.	 Therefore,	 political	lobbying	 of	 the	 CMA	 is	 going	 to	 be	 more	 intense	 on	 state	 aid	 measures	 than	competition	matters.	 For	 instance,	 the	 UK	 government	 could	 attempt	 to	 use	 a	new	 “Strategic	 Steer”,	 presently	 used	 as	 an	 instrument	 available	 to	 the	Government	to	inform	the	CMA	of	what	its	long-term	goals	for	competition	and	growth,58	in	 order	 to	 indicate	 some	 spending	 orientations	 that	 could	 however	later	come	back	in	front	of	the	CMA	as	possible	investigations,	and	eventually	be	prohibited	as	incompatible	with	the	domestic	regime	of	state	aid	control.	As	far	as	 regulatory	 capture	 is	 concerned,	 decentralization	 does,	 of	 course,	 offer	 a	remedy	 for	 information	 problems	 that	 do	 exist	 between	 firms	 and	 their	supranational	authority.	However,	in	the	state	aid	context,	although	beneficiaries	of	aid	tend	to	be	concentrated,	such	as	 in	competition	law,	they	also	tend	to	be	more	 heterogeneous,	 and	 the	 negative	 externalities	 are	 very	 wide,	 potentially	impacting	 all	 taxpayers,59	and	 making	 the	 task	 of	 national	 authorities	 more	complicated.	 To	 summarise,	 the	CMA’s	 independence,	 despite	 not	 being	 in	 any	way	disputed,	would	need	to	be	fully	preserved	and	perhaps	even	strengthened.	As	 suggested	by	Bacon,	Peretz	and	Taylor,	 in	 a	 timely	and	 influential	 report,	 it	may	 be	 appropriate	 for	 the	 UK	 Parliament	 and	 the	 devolved	 legislatures	 to	appoint	 key	 CMA	 officials. 60 	A	 Panel,	 or	 a	 Board,	 which	 would	 involve																																																									57		 The	 accession	 countries’	 experience,	 whereby	 national	 authorities	 have	 be	 entrusted	with	the	duty	to	align	national	law	with	EU	law,	is	arguably	of	limited	relevance	as	the	ultimate	goal	is	still	that	of	matching	EU	law,	under	the	penalty	of	non-EU	membership.	See,	however,	for	some	 interesting	 comments	 on	 the	 experience	 of	 Croatia,	M.	 Schonberg,	Continuity	 or	 change?	
State	aid	control	in	a	post-Brexit	United	Kingdom’	[2017]	Comp	Law,	47.		
58  Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Government’s	response	to	the	Consultation	
on	 the	 Strategic	 Steer	 to	 the	 Competition	 and	Markets	 Authority	 (December	 2015),	 available	 at	https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/481040/BIS-15-659-government-response-governments-strategic-steer-to-the-competition-and-markets-authority.pdf	 (accessed	 20	May	 2018).	  The Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy is presently consulting on possible reform of the ‘strategic steer’: see 
Green Paper, Modernising Consumer Markets (April 2018),  Chapter 5, available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6999
37/modernising-consumer-markets-green-paper.pdf (accessed 20 May 2018).  
59			 See	P.	Werner	and	V.	Verouden	 ‘The	Law	and	Economics	of	EU	State	Aid	Control’	 in	P.	Werner	and	V.	Verouden	(eds),	EU	State	Aid	Control,	Law	and	Economics	(Kluwer	2017),	ch.	1.	
60	K.	 Bacon	 QC	 and	 G.	 Peretz	 QC,	 Paper	 on	 post-Brexit	 options	 for	 State	 aid	 (November	 2016),	available	 at:	 http://uksala.org/paper-on-post-brexit-options-for-state-aid	 (accessed	 20	 May	2018)	 and	K.	 Bacon	QC,	 G.	 Peretz	QC	 and	 I.	 Taylor,	Bringing	State	aid	home:	Could	an	effective	
domestic	 state	 aid	 regime	 be	 devised	 for	 the	 UK?	 (May	 2017),	 available	 at	http://uksala.org/bringing-state-aid-home-could-an-effective-domestic-state-aid-regime-be-devised-for-the-uk	 (accessed	 20	 May	 2018).	 See	 also	 UK	 State	 Aid	 Law	 Association,	 Written	evidence	to	the	House	of	Lords	Internal	Market	Sub-Committee’s	Inquiry	into	Competition	Policy	
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representatives	 of	 the	 devolved	 legislatures,	 which	 could	 meet	 perhaps	 on	 a	regular	 basis	 in	 various	 parts	 of	 the	 UK,	 may	 also	 dispel	 fears	 that	 a	 lack	 of	pervasive	 state	 aid	 control	 could	 endanger	 solidarity	 and	 equality	 of	 spending	between	the	different	regions	of	the	UK.			Third,	one	of	the	most	challenging	tasks	for	the	CMA,	as	for	any	form	of	system	to	control	subsidies,	would	be	to	choose	how	to	decide	whether	a	certain	measure,	despite	being	classified	as	aid,	could	still	be	deemed	to	be	beneficial	because	 it	pursues	an	aim	for	the	‘common	good’.	In	the	EU,	this	task	is	carried	out	by	the	Commission’s	 application	 of	 the	 compatibility	 grounds	 listed	 in	 Article	 107(3)	TFEU,	which	uses	the	 ‘common	European	interest’	as	a	benchmark.	In	contrast,	the	CMA	must	gradually	build	a	UK	wide	common	interest.		A	 final	 aspect	 to	 be	 considered	 is	 transparency.	 The	 EU	 state	 aid	 system,	 as	shaped	by	the	GBER,	is	heavily	reliant	on	stringent	transparency	obligations,	as	all	Member	States	are	under	an	obligation	to	publish	all	individual	awards	of	aid	granted	under	the	GBER	that	exceed	EUR	0.5	million.	Article	10	GBER	provides	that	 failure	 to	 comply	 with	 transparency	 requirements	 may	 lead	 to	 a	Commission	 decision	 that	 all,	 or	 some,	 future	 aid	 measures	 adopted	 by	 the	Member	State	in	question	are	to	be	notified	to	the	Commission	and	sanctions	are	to	be	ordered.61	A	 similar	 robust	 system	should	be	 introduced	by	 the	UK,	once	again	 as	 a	 guarantee	 of	 fairness	 in	 public	 spending	 decisions,	 and	 as	 a	way	 of	alerting	competitors	and	other	interested	parties	to	the	grant	of	aid.		
	
3.3.		Dispute	Settlement		The	final	pillar	of	a	UK	system	of	state	aid	control	is	to	provide	a	system	in	order	to	deal	with	the	inevitable	gradual	divergence	and	possible	clashes	between	EU	state	aid	law	and	the	domestic	version.	This	is	an	issue	which	goes	significantly	beyond	 state	 aid	 control,	 but	 it	 is	 one	 issue	 which	 is	 key	 to	 the	 whole	 future	EU/UK	 trade	 agreement.	 Therefore,	 for	 present	 purposes,	 a	 few	 observations	will	need	to	suffice.	First,	to	prevent	and	defuse	probable	future	disputes,	a	Joint	Committee	 comprised	 of	 both	 EU	 and	 UK	 representatives	 could	 be	 set	 up	 in	order	to	monitor,	review,	and	possibly	settle,	the	potential	divergences	on	state	aid	 control	between	Commission	practice,	EU	 case	 law	and	UK	domestic	 law.62		Taking	 the	 fact	 that	 some	 form	 of	 state	 aid	 control	 will	 be	 inserted	 into	 any																																																																																																																																																															and	 Brexit	 (September	 2017),	 available	 at:	 http://uksala.org/written-evidence-to-house-of-lords-internal-market-sub-committees-inquiry-into-competition-policy-and-brexit	 (accessed	 20	May	 2018).	 The	 authors	 observe	 that	 the	 ‘domestication’	 of	 state	 aid	 control	 also	 offers	 an	opportunity	for	dealing	with	perceived	weaknesses	of	the	EU	system	in	terms	of	participation	of	interested	 parties,	 competitors	 and	 consumers	 alike	 in	 an	 investigation	 procedure	 that	 is	 still	essentially	bilateral	between	the	Commission	and	the	Member	State	concerned.		They	also	make	less	 specific	 proposals	 on,	 for	 instance,	 the	 implications	 of	 CMA	 decisions	 to	 prohibit	 aid	measures	and	on	judicial	review.	61		 GBER	cit	fn	n.15.	62		 Article	157	of	the	Draft	Withdrawal	Agreement	could	be	used	as	a	model	for	the	future.	It	provides	in	particular	that	that	a	Joint	Committee	will	“supervise	and	facilitate	the	implementation	
and	 application	 of	 this	 Agreement”	 and	 seek	 “appropriate	 ways	 and	 methods	 of	 preventing	
problems	 that	might	 arise	 in	 areas	 covered	 by	 this	 Agreement	 or	 of	 resolving	 disputes	 that	may	
arise	regarding	the	interpretation	and	application	of	this	Agreement”.	
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future	EU/UK	trade	agreement	for	granted,	when	a	certain	aid	measure,	which	is	either	granted	to	a	UK	or	to	an	EU	undertaking,	may	(to	borrow	the	language	of	the	 FTA)	 “negatively	 affect,	 [or	 is]	 likely	 to	 affect,	 competition	 and	 trade”,63	a	mechanism	to	settle	possible	disputes	will	have	to	be	set	up.	This	is	indeed	one	of	the	most	controversial	points	of	the	future	negotiations.	The	position	of	the	UK	Government	 is	 to	 press	 for	 the	 ‘tailored	 approach’	 even	 on	 the	 question	 of	enforcement,	with	 different	models	 being	proposed	 for	 different	 subject	 areas.	As	 for	 trade	 disputes,	 the	 preferred	 option	 of	 the	 UK	 Government	 would	 be	arbitration.64	However,	 the	 ‘arbitration’	 option	 seems	 particularly	 problematic	from	 the	 EU	 perspective.	 In	 Opinion	 2/15 65 	relating	 to	 the	 division	 of	competences	between	 the	EU	and	 the	Member	States	 for	 the	ratification	of	 the	EU/Singapore	 FTA,	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 held	 that	 the	 State-to-State	 arbitral	mechanism	 provided	 in	 the	 agreement	 impaired	 the	 ‘autonomy’	 of	 EU	 law	because	 it	 removes	 “disputes	 from	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 courts	 of	 the	Member	
States	or	of	the	European	Union”.	Consequently,	both	the	arbitration	mechanisms	governing	 dispute	 settlements	 between	 investors	 and	 the	 contracting	 parties	(“ISDS”)	 and	 the	 contracting	 parties	 among	 themselves	 (State-to-State)	 fell	within	 the	 mixed	 competences	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 its	 Member	 States,	66	implicitly	making	 the	 future	 ratification	 of	 a	 UK/EU	 agreement	 containing	 such	 a	 clause	more	complicated.	The	Court	of	Justice’s	‘unfriendly’	approach	to	arbitration	has	been	 confirmed	 in	 it	 recent	 judgment	 in	 Slovak	 Republic	 v	 Achmea,67	where	 it	held	 that	 an	 arbitration	 clause	 contained	 in	 the	Netherlands/Slovakia	Bilateral	Investment	 Treaty	 was	 incompatible	 with	 EU	 law	 because	 it	 breached	 its	‘autonomy’.		Although,	 on	 a	 cursory	 reading	 of	 the	 two	 decisions,	 the	 possible	 use	 of	 an	arbitration	 a	 settlement	 dispute	mechanism	 seems	 to	 be	 excluded,	 it	 could	 be	observed	 that	 in	Opinion	2/15	the	State-to-State	dispute	settlement	mechanism	was	 applicable	 to	 an	 area,	 namely	 portfolio	 investments,	which	 fell	within	 the	mixed	competences	of	 the	EU	and	 its	Member	States,68	which	would	not	be	the	case	for	state	aid,	a	clear-cut	area	of	exclusive	EU	competence.69	Analogously,	the	issue	of	arbitration	impinging	on	the	autonomy	of	EU	law	in	Achmea	seems	to	be	limited	to	the	specific	investor/State	dispute	settlement	mechanism	included	in	the	 Netherlands/Slovakia	 agreement,	 ,	 as	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice’s	 judgment	revolved	 around	 an	 arbitration	 agreement	 which,	 in	 its	 applicable	 law	 clause,	expressly	attributed	to	the	arbitral	tribunal	the	competence	to	interpret	EU	law,	thereby	manifestly	violating	the	Court	of	Justice’s	monopoly	to	interpret	EU	law																																																									63		 EU/Vietnam	FTA	cit	fn	n.41,	Chapter	II,	Article	Lxl.	64		 House	of	Lords	European Union Internal Market Sub-Committee cit	fn	n.25.	65		 Opinion	 2/15,	 Free	 Trade	 Agreement	 between	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 the	 Republic	 of	
Singapore,	ECLI:	EU:	C:	2017:376.		66		 Opinion	2/15	id.	paras.	285	to	304.		67		 Case	C-284/16,	Slovak	Republic	v	Achmea	BV,	ECLI:	EU:	C:	2018:158.		68		 Opinion	2/15	cit	fn	n.65,	para.	305.	69		 Case	 C-272/12	 P	 European	 Commission	 v	 Ireland,	 ECLI:	 EU:	 C:	 2013:812.	 The	 Court	recently	clarified	that	Opinion	2/1	5had	to	be	read	in	the	context	of	EU/Singapore	agreement,	as	“there	was	no	possibility	of	the	required	majority	being	obtained	within	the	Council	for	the	Union	to	




Achmea	the	Court	of	Justice	seems	to	have	been	very	concerned	with	the	removal	of	national	courts’	 jurisdiction	over	 investor/state	disputes,	as	 this	would	have	the	effect	of	impairing	of	the	preliminary	reference	procedure	guaranteed	under	Article	 267	 TFEU. 71 	This	 issue	 manifestly	 does	 not	 arise	 in	 state-to-state	arbitration,	which	 regards	 inter-state	 relationships	 removed	by	definition	 from	the	jurisdiction	of	national	courts.	Therefore,	the	Court	of	Justice’s	objections	to	arbitration	 contained	 in	 both	 Opinion	 2/15	 and	 Achmea,	 seem	 to	 apply	 to	investor/state	 arbitration,	 and	 consequently	 don’t	 rule	 out	 state-to	 state	arbitration	 as	 a	 mean	 of	 dispute	 settlement	 in	 international	 agreements	concluded	by	the	EU.	A	variation	of	state-to-state	arbitration	 is	provided	 in	the	Moldova,	 Ukraine	 and	 Georgia	 Association	 Agreements,	 which	 allow	 the	settlement	of	disputes	between	the	parties	to	be	referred	to	an	arbitration	panel,	but	 require	 the	 arbitral	 panel	 to	make	 a	 preliminary	 reference	 to	 the	 Court	 of	Justice	where	specific	questions	of	EU	law	arise.72		However,	 the	 inclusion	 of	 a	 preliminary	 reference	 procedure	 in	 a	 UK/EU	Agreement	 does	 not	 seem	 ideal	 for	 several	 reasons.	 For	 a	 start,	 a	 preliminary	reference	system	could	be	a	particularly	sticky	point	for	the	UK.	In	listing	its	‘red-lines’	relating	to	a	future	EU/UK	agreement,	the	UK	Government	has	repeatedly	indicated	 that	 it	will	not	accept	 the	continuation	of	 the	 jurisdiction	of	 the	CJEU	within	 a	 future	 EU/UK	 trade	 agreement	73Furthermore,	 despite	 preliminary	references	 intuitively	 being	 a	 simplification	 tool,	 in	 terms	 of	 protecting	 the	“autonomy”	 of	 the	 EU,	 there	 is	 no	 guarantee	 that	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 will	 be	prepared	to	accept	it	in	any	future	EU/UK	agreement.		Finally,	as	mentioned	above,	the	aim	of	these	kinds	of	agreements	is	the	perfect	alignment	of	the	national	law	of	a	potential	accession	state	with	the	system	of	EU	law.	 	 An	 alternative	 and	more	 “political”	 solution	 could	 instead	 be	 a	 “regular”	state-to-state	 arbitration	 tribunal,	 coupled	 with	 a	 joint	 organ	 providing	 an	interpretation	of	the	provisions	of	the	agreement	that	is	binding	on	the	arbitral	tribunal;	 an	 example	 of	 this	 mechanism	 is	 the	 Joint	 Committee	 in	 the	 CETA	Agreement.74			Another	 possible	 dispute	 resolution	 mechanism	 for	 the	 future	 EU/UK	relationship	in	the	field	of	state	aid	could	be	the	creation	of	a	new	international	court	composed	of	judges	chosen	by	the	EU	and	the	UK.	Even	if	this	solution	has	been	soundly	rejected	in	practice	by	the	Court	of	Justice	numerous	times,75	it	has,	in	 principle,	 deemed	 this	 to	 be	 a	 viable	 approach.76	It	 remains	 to	 be	 seen,																																																									70		 Opinion	 2/13,	 Accession	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 to	 the	 European	 Convention	 for	 the	
Protection	of	Human	Rights	and	Fundamental	Freedoms,	ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454,	paras	204-214.	71		 Slovak	Republic	v	Achmea	cit	fn	n.67,	para.	35.	72		 See	e.g.	Article	321	of	the	EU/Ukraine	Association	Agreement	(fn.52).	
73 See the discussion in House of Lords European Union Internal Market Sub-Committee, Brexit: 
Dispute Resolution and Enforcement HL Paper 130 (3 May February 2018), available at 
ttps://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/130 (accessed 6 June 2018). 74		 CETA	Agreement	cit	fn	n.39,	Article	216(4)	a.	75		 Opinion	1/09,	European	Patent	Court	[2011]	E.C.R.	I-1137,	ECLI:	EU:	C:	2011:123.	76		 Opinion	1/91,	EEA	Agreement	I	 	 [1991]	E.C.R.	 I-6079,	ECLI:	EU:	C:	1991:490,	paras.	40	and	70.	
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however,	based	on	the	past	case	law	of	the	Court	of	Justice	as	to	the	autonomy	of	EU	 law,	whether	the	design	of	 the	new	investment	court,	which	 is	contained	 in	the	 CETA	 Agreement,	 and	 is	 currently	 under	 consideration	 by	 the	 Court	 of	Justice,77	will	survive	the	scrutiny	of	the	Court.	The	outcome	may	shed	more	light	on	 the	 feasibility	 of	 a	 court-like	 system	 of	 dispute	 settlement	 to	 arbitrate	 in	disputes	between	the	EU	and	UK	in	the	field	of	state	aid.		
4.	The	Fourth	Quartet:	 ‘What	we	call	the	beginning	is	often	the	end.	And	to	
make	an	end	is	to	make	a	beginning’		Back	 in	Port	Talbot,	nearly	 two	years	on	 from	 the	EU	Referendum	and	despite	Tata	Steel’s	plans	of	new	investment,	concerns	over	the	future	of	jobs	did	not	die	down.		Certainly,	EU	rules	on	state	aid	for	the	steel	sector	did	not	help,	because	they	 are	 very	 restrictive,	 being	 based	 on	 a	 rather	 draconian	 principle	 that	 no	further	 state	 aid	 should	 be	 given	 to	 rescue	 or	 restructure	 steel	 firms.	78	It	 is,	however,	equally	true,	and	clearly	demonstrated	in	a	study	from	Cardiff	Business	School,	how	EU	state	aid	rules	were	a	small	part	of	a	larger	problem	of	a	market	structure	based	on	the	presence	of	heavily	subsidized	imports	from	China	and	of	an	 industrial	 sector	 lacking	 investment	 in	 energy	 efficiency	 and	 modern	technologies.79	The	 same	 report	 claims	 that	 crashing	 out	 of	 the	 EU	without	 an	agreement	and	relying	on	WTO	rules	would	cause	the	Welsh	economy	to	shrink	by	between	8	and	10%,	equivalent	to	£1,500-£2,000	per	person	in	Wales.80			Rules	on	the	control	of	public	spending	are	therefore	just	one	aspect	of	a	much	more	complex	set	of	 issues,	such	as	the	role	the	state	 in	a	modern	economy,	of	the	balance	between	trade	liberalization	and	the	preservation	of	public	interests,	and	so	on.	State	aid	rules	should	then	be	taken	on	their	face	value,	as	rules	that	are	aimed	at	preventing	governments	of	the	day	from	passing	legislation	which	only	 favours	 certain	 industries,	 and	 invest	 according	 to	 their	 priorities,	 and	 at	the	same	time	tailored	as	to	ensure	that	financial	help	is	granted,	but	only	so	far	as	 certain	 public	 policies	 and	 transparent	 rules	 are	 complied	 with.	 Rules	 that	sanction	 inefficient	 operators,	 but	 that	 reward	 innovation	 and	 companies	 that	add	social	value,	as	well	as	decisions	that	preserve	regional	solidarity.	 	 If	 these	principles	are	embodied	in	a	future	UK	regime	on	state	aid	control,		“all	shall	be	
well	and	All	manner	of	thing	shall	be	well”.				
																																																								77		 Opinion	1/17,	EU/Canada	Comprehensive	Economic	and	Trade	Agreement,	pending.	78		 European	 Commission,	 Communication	 concerning	 certain	 aspects	 of	 the	 treatment	 of	competition	cases	 resulting	 from	 the	expiry	of	 the	ECSC	Treaty,	OJ	2002	C	152/5,	paras.	18-21	and	Communication	on	Rescue	and	Restructuring	aid	and	closure	aid	for	the	steel	sector,	OJ	2002	C	70/22.	79		 See	EU	Transition	 and	Economic	Prospects	 for	 Large	 and	Medium	Sized	 Firms	 in	Wales,	available	 at:	 https://gov.wales/docs/det/publications/180202-eu-transition-and-economic-prospects-for-large-and-medium-sized-firms-in-wales-en.pdf	(18		(accessed	on	6	June	2018).	80		 Id.	pages	82	and	83.		
